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- On Jouissance as an 
Ontological Factor 
 
Dominik Finkelde SJ 
 
Lacan’s concept jouissance marks the both painful and joyful disturbance of a mind’s 
libidinal equilibrium which also gives coherence to the basic structure of reality from 
the point of view of the individual. Because someone can live a fulfilling life and be 
happy at all levels of what modern society has to offer, and yet may not resist a very 
specific form of jouissance – to risk all in favor of a small and obscene deviation from 
the ordinary: through a WhatsApp message to a minor showing oneself half naked, 
through cocaine use or a photo of a preteen Thai girl which is hidden in a drawer. 
The life of the individual becomes condensed as symbolic in confrontation with this 
minor and sinful deviation from the conventional (the nude photo from Thailand, the 
drugs, etc.) which, paradoxically, is effective only by being potentially capable of 
destroying the symbolic universe of the individual. The seemingly ‘slight deviation’ 
(Epicurus) may influence as traumatic and overly intense encounter with an other 
the subject’s ability to accept the full ontological weight of her or his world 
experience. Lacan’s notion of jouissance helps us understand this kind of 
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transgression, which an individual mind might have to risk as a reenactment of what 
Lacan calls the “forced choice” of subjectivity. 
 
1. Introduction 
In the broad literature on Lacan the concept jouissance is often interpreted as an 
idiosyncratic form of enjoyment.1 It embodies a pleasure-and-pain economy and 
opposes the homeostasis principle presented within the philosophy of 
psychoanalysis in Freud’s multiple comments on the Lustprinzip. In Mourning and 
Melancholia (1917) Freud mentions the “self-tormenting [...] which is without doubt 
enjoyable”2 and in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) he detects how a life-
consuming enjoyment of trauma patients gives them something more in return by 
not letting go of “the situation of [the traumatic] accident.”3 Lacan follows Freud and 
speaks in the course of his development of the concept specifically of surplus-
enjoyment: a paradoxical pleasure that involves a certain type of suffering with 
violent consequences that threaten the mind and the body. Jouissance, he says, can 
be a “path towards death,”4 since “without a transgression there is no access to 
jouissance.”5 Jacques-Alain Miller’s often-cited essay on the “Six Paradigms of 
Jouissance” in Lacan’s oeuvre is one of the most concise elaboration’s of the 
concept’s development from the early seminars to the later ones, if one interprets the 
chronological order as presented by Miller not as one that questions the concept’s 
multiplicity of facets.6 He shows the ways in which, at different stages of his work, 
Lacan links jouissance to his so-called “three registers”, the symbolic, the imaginary 
and the real, into which subjectivity is, libidinally and normatively, woven, like in a 
threefold cord. He so underlines that jouissance can be narcissistic as captured in an 
imaginary dyad of ego and alter ego, but it can be symbolic as well; insofar as 
jouissance emanates from demand (Seminar V) and it can touch upon the real as 
that which cannot be represented. Here the human being enjoys at the cost of his 
own wellbeing an experience that is beyond norms and imaginations. And this 
enjoyment is his wellbeing even if his wellbeing is exactly what is lost.7 In the lecture 
“Psychoanalysis and Medicine” Lacan writes: “What I call jouissance – in the sense in 
which the body experiences itself – is always in the nature of a tension, of a forcing, 
of a spending, even of an exploit. Unquestionably, jouissance starts in the moment 
when pain begins to appear, and we know that it is only at this level of pain that a 
whole dimension of the organism, which would otherwise remain veiled, can be 
experienced.”8 
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The following paragraphs now focus especially on what Miller calls 
“impossible jouissance.”9 The goal is not so much to repeat Miller’s insights, which 
have been taken up and elaborated by others, but to broaden his reading of 
jouissance as surplus-enjoyment and as transgression of the Law (in the name of 
Law) with regard to Lacan’s concept of “forced choice,” i.e. the unconscious 
submission that an individual has to endure in the genealogy of its ego-function. 
Lacan posits his theory of “forced choice” especially but not exclusively in Seminar XI. 
The purpose of this investigation is to better understand jouissance as a libidinal 
source that can push the human being to reset her/his conditions of life-submissions 
by crisscrossing the so-called symbolic order (embodied by what Lacan calls the 
“big Other”). As such, this article seeks to show that within Lacan’s concept of 
“impossible jouissance” (in his middle-period) a “jouissance of enigmatic vengeance” 
can also be found. Thus, it helps to interpret jouissance not exclusively as a clinical 
concept but also as an ontological one. And it is here, where sin becomes of 
importance, since within the philosophy of psychoanalysis it accounts – similar to the 
biblical account of the first, ‘original’ sin in the Garden of Eden (Gen. III) – for the link 
between lack, language, the normativity of the symbolic, and the emergence of a 
self. Subjectivity experiences itself not simply as being stuck time and again in 
relations with all kinds of objects (with their demands, their ‘appeal’, their negativity). 
Subjectivity can, in addition, literally transform itself into an “abject” of the world with 
the goal to recalibrate the world as the subject knows it from the position of its 
(sinful-autistic) singularity. In contrast to Kristeva’s often-cited use of the concept 
“abjection”, the concept’s intension as presented here does not refer to something 
that both “disturbs identity, system, or order,” and “does not respect borders, 
positions, [or] rules.”10 On the contrary, here, abjection is interpreted as a form 
through which to realize one’s existence through touching upon what cannot be 
represented, i.e. the real. This acting-out property of jouissance (passage à l’acte) will 
be elucidated in the following paragraphs as enigmatic vengeance with regard to 
two examples (one from fiction, one from politics). It is paradoxical since the subjects 
in question gain surplus enjoyment through not only questioning but even potentially 
destroying their own conditions of symbolic life. Jouissance is therefore described as 
an erotic and sinful force of an individual’s psyche to question the foundations of its 
own reality through transforming her- or himself into an abject of the world. 
The argument will be demonstrated with regard to two individuals: one taken 
from a work of fiction, the movie The Thin Red Line (1993) directed by Terrence 
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Malick, where a colonel finds – similar to Ernst Jünger’s essay “Copse 125” (1925) – 
an unconditional ground of existence in risking his life and the life of others in a 
senseless up-hill battle. The second example is taken from a political scandal from 
the 2010s: Anthony Weiner’s obscene enjoyment of a picture-exchange with an 
under-aged girl. The former politician of the Democratic Party annihilated his political 
career by sending explicit photos of himself half-naked to a minor. I try to rationalize 
with Lacan the behavior of the two individuals as paradigmatic examples that 
exemplify not only impossible jouissance (which Lacan sees at work also in what he 
calls “feminine jouissance” as acted out by Antigone and Teresa of Ávila), but also 
jouissance of enigmatic vengeance. The behaviors of the two personalities 
mentioned above exemplify ‘slight deviations’ (or unpredictable swerves) of 
individuals, which as traumatic and overly intense encounters of an ‘other’ within the 
symbolic, give the individuals the ability to accept the full ontological weight of their 
world experience. A structure of agency comes to light through which, in a single 
moment, the subject’s situation within its social framework can dramatically shift. In 
other words, this article shows how people may try to reenact, through an obscene 
painful-and-joyful transgression, their own genealogy of submission/subjugation in 
the process of civilization by suspending the normative and evaluative use-value of 
what is generally understood from Aristotle onwards as “the good life.” Sending half-
nude self-portraits to a minor (Case of Weiner) or starting a militarily operation with 
excessive casualties (Captain Tall) dialectically changes the lives of the subjects in a 
way that mirrors Lacan’s fascination with jouissance as an ontological factor. It lays 
bare what subjectivity, in its core, is about: being a limit of the world. As such, 
jouissance does not so much express Lacan’s Hegelian conviction that “subject and 
object” mediate themselves through time, but that subjects must try – in order to 
relate to objects – to cut the very relations that tie them to others, in order to regain or 
rediscover their singularity of being. Situations of acting-out can exclude individuals 
from the social group. What has pushed them to go that far? Which forces are 
accountable for apparently catastrophic results? The article shows that through 
entering the social world (i.e., the chain of signifiers), the subject is forced to accept 
normative restrictions. This involves the sacrifice of its pre-symbolic enjoyment 
which, then, might strike back. It breaks through, as jouissance, in violent moments 
and seeks to establish a new order of being – one, in which both the rules and the 
specific jouissance of the subject get their share.11 
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2. On certainty 
In the acclaimed movie The Thin Red Line (directed by Terrance Malick in 1998) a 
Colonel of the United States Army, named Gordon Tall (played by Nick Nolte), forces 
his unit to conquer a small hill densely covered with vegetation during the so-called 
“Guadalcanal Campaign” against the Empire of Japan. Against his captain’s 
objections that the risk of losing is too high, the Colonel breaks out angrily: “I’ve 
waited all my life for this! I’ve worked, I’ve slaved, I’ve eaten untold buckets of shit to 
get this opportunity, and I’m not passing it up now!” Soldiers, who fear for their life, try 
to argue the colonel out of his decision with cost-benefit calculations, but the “call” of 
the hill proves to be stronger. The hill, the colonel admits, is his hill, as if his personal 
life condenses into this catastrophic situation in which the hill’s capture, absurd and 
dangerous as it actually is from the perspective of the Lustprinzip, shall not be 
missed. Since the colonel sees the embattled hill not as a strategic point of conquest 
in the fight against the Japanese, but as an individual bastion of his life, his rage 
exemplifies Lacan’s understanding of jouissance as an excess that transgresses the 
limits of Freud’s pleasure principle.  
It appears as if Tall’s life has the chance to somehow be granted consistency 
after a long and painful period of submission, and the colonel says so explicitly in the 
face of his confused captain. With a reference to a famous quote from Lacan’s 
Seminar XI one could say: The image of the hill is in the Colonel’s eye, but he himself 
“is in the tableau.”12 Thus, for a moment, the Colonel embodies a trait that Lacan 
describes as paranoia, for “contrary to the normal subject for whom reality is always 
in the right place, [the psychotic subject] is certain of something, which is that 
[which] is at issue – ranging from hallucination to interpretation – regards him. Reality 
isn’t at issue for him, certainty is.”13 Indeed, for the Colonel, certainty is at stake. 
Suddenly, his miserable life has the chance to experience a form of absolution from 
another dimension of reality.  
The hill literally becomes what Freud calls “das Ding” in a side-note of his 
“Project of a Scientific Psychology.” Lacan, as is well-known, takes up this concept in 
Seminar VII to explain the psychological source of surplus-enjoyment. He links 
Freud’s term even to Kant’s fascination with “the Law” that, through 
unaccomplishable injunctions, overburdens the subject by definition. The Thing is 
nothing less than the “primordial pivot around which the effects of the unconscious 
revolve”.14 “Das Ding,” he says, “is a primordial function which is located at the level of 
the initial establishment of the gravitation of the unconscious Vorstellungen.”15 
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Precisely because the Thing occupies the most obscure core of the unconscious, it 
deserves to be identified as the most elemental motive cause of human behavior.16 
In the words of Jacques-Alain Miller: “What is then meant by das Ding, the Thing? It 
means that satisfaction, the truth, the drive, the Befriedigung, is found neither in the 
imaginary or the symbolic, that it is outside what is symbolized, that it is of the order 
of the real.... everything in the two-level assembly of Lacan’s great graph [of desire] is 
set up against real jouissance, in order to contain real jouissance.”17 
Here the Thing functions as a melancholy object of loss that can never be 
incorporated by the subject, since its loss is an a priori condition of subjectivity. Yet it 
must be fantasized as lost, since a subject who is not forever plagued by the 
experience of having been robbed of its substance would not be a subject at all. As 
such we are compelled to reach out for the Thing, and since we cannot attain it, limit 
our desire with the help of substitutions of das Ding: various objects of desire, called 
by Lacan objets a. “Normal jouissance” (to quote Miller 5th paradigm of jouissance) 
can attach itself to objets a but “mad” desire of jouissance cannot. It strives for more. 
One could also say that something in Colonel Tall has failed to be expressed in 
the order of the signifier and that the situation of life-threatening stress he finds 
himself in is a way out of this impasse at whatever cost. So, while, on this account, 
desire operates according to Lacan’s so-called “three registers” (the symbolic, the 
imaginary, the real) via the imaginary and the symbolic as some kind of barrier 
against the real, it is, by contrast, jouissance that becomes the driving force of the 
real against the registers of the imaginary and the symbolic. A new form of singularity 
finds shape. It is, as Eric Santner asserts, “a non-relational excess which is out-of-joint 
with respect to [...] any form of teleological absorption by a larger purpose.”18 Arbitrary 
life stages are about to fall into a totality that suddenly makes sense for Tall. All that 
has to be done is to put everything in jeopardy, such that everything that can be 
risked becomes, at the moment of a potential failure, what it may already be: actually 
nothing, prevented enjoyment of a badly treated soldier, who has not had a chance 
to get a share of “suum cuique” from the Lacanian big Other. Jouissance confronts 
us here within the form of the colonel’s excessive desire as a traumatic element, a 
core of intensity, which contradicts moderation.19  
Apparently one property of Lacan’s concept is to underline that for us humans 
the world in its common sense understanding of everyday-life is not supposed to be 
experienced as coherent. If this is true, then this insight into a certain form of 
incoherence has the paradoxical quality of sanctioning our lives, and especially 
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where we find it both miserable and threatened by failure as well as suffocated by 
too much perfection and harmony. This may explain why Lacan interprets jouissance 
from the 1960s onwards as a form of “moral masochism” (Freud) and asserts, with 
regard to Kant, that “if one eliminates from morality every element of sentiments, if 
one removes or invalidates all guidance to be found in sentiments, then in the final 
analysis the de Sadeian world is conceivable – as one of the possible forms of the 
world governed by a radical ethics, by the Kantian ethics as elaborated in 1788.”20  
Lacan’s reference to Kant’s moral law is of importance here as it actually is a 
law out of reach for humans, a law of anticipated inaccessibility that carries an 
infinite desire (especially in comparison to Aristotle’s ethics); or better, which carries 
an infinite and excessive demand in itself. As such, the law can be a paradoxical 
inspiration of restlessness, an existential electricity that serves the subject even in 
situations when it risks, through abjection, its own life or the well-being of a 
community.21 Jouissance as both the enigma of vengeance and the act of abjection 
does not refer us to small pleasures or forms of excitement that are collectively 
celebrated, for example, on New Year’s Eve. Rather, Lacan means in his “retour à 
Freud” especially life-threatening forms of enjoyment – similar to Colonel Tall’s 
obsession – which are fundamentally based on a radical questioning of the symbolic 
order of which the subject is a part. (It is worth mentioning, that this kind of 
jouissance is uncovered by Lacan within Teresa of Ávila’s spiritual “mystical 
ejaculations [which] are neither idle chatter nor empty verbiage”.22 Lacan speaks of a 
jouissance beyond the phallus23 i.e. a jouissance which the signifier is unable to 
restrict and or to delimit. Because, as Lacan says, with regard to Bernini’s Teresa, 
“she is having jouissance [... but knows] nothing about it.”24 As Lucie Cantin has 
shown, the catholic nun of the Carmelite order is intensely concerned with her honor 
and the importance of her words, as she was ordered by her superiors to write her 
experience down. But while Teresa’s autobiographic notes and her confessions 
obliged her to reveal everything she was limited by jouissance itself. “[S]he could not 
free her from that capture in a jouissance that disorganized her.”25) 
 
3. Place-out-of-place 
A similar example to Colonel Tall’s excessive enjoyment that carries a pleasure-in-
pain economy beyond “the good life” (more on this below) can be elaborated upon 
through the tragi-comical fate of the American politician Anthony Weiner. The 
Democrat ruined his career and that of his wife, who was one of Hillary Clinton’s 
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closest advisors between 2015 and 2017, by repeatedly sending a photo of himself 
with a bath towel around his waist to a minor girl via his mobile phone. The 
published pictures of Weiner were amusing to a wide audience as, in one of the 
photos, Wiener literally grabs himself by his name (as in Wiener Würstchen). 
Curiously, however, it was not so much the fact of his questionable behavior but, 
rather, that he was caught again in a similar pose several months after the scandal 
calmed down (figure 1), which ended his public career.26  
My admittedly speculative thesis (which asks for a maximally charitable 
reading) is that Weiner, as in the case of colonel Tall, had to act as he did against all 
odds of cost-benefit calculations since his world experience might have received 
within his mind its ontological consistency only through this form of a constitutive 
violation of the symbolic order and his role – touching the circles of a potential 
president (Hillary Clinton) – within it. The violation of the pleasure principle, which 
aims as a principle of suffering at a place-out-of-place, “keeps us in this world,” as 
Lacan says.27 We live to destabilize living, since life would be unbearable without its 




Figure 1: Anthony Weiner, Selfie (detail) 
Since Lacan understands from Seminar VII onwards jouissance even as an 
ethical principle (which is not the same as being a principle within Ethics) his 
distance to Aristotle and the peculiar pleasure-and-desire administration within the 
Aristotelian understanding of “the good life” could not be more extreme. Near the 
beginning of Book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle repeatedly defines the 
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concept of “right” desire as a necessary condition for successful practical thinking 
and moral excellence.28 He writes: “moral virtue is a state of character concerned 
with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be 
true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just 
what the former asserts.”29 The enjoyment of buying a house is not supposed to carry 
us away beyond the limits of reasons. In this sense, right desire is restricted by 
practical reasoning. It needs limits to arrive at a level of true satisfaction and true 
enjoyment which helps the individual to flourish. Right desire, then, fits our basic 
enjoyments as needs that are features of the human nature. In this sense the notion 
of a good choice is truly objective insofar as it is grounded in facts about the world 
(including facts about my place in this world) and in facts about what constitutes 
human flourishing. When our choices conform to these facts, then our desire is right. 
As such, practical thought and desire are directed toward the same goal (eupraxia = 
acting well). Desire and intellect share the same content.  
So, it is no wonder that perfect enjoyment is personified in the “unmoved 
mover”. One can find it as well, according to Jonathan Lear, in true contemplation.30 
This explains in part why Aristotle questions repeatedly the Sophists in his Ethics as 
they present themselves as the enemies of true rest promulgating a false and vain 
understanding of enjoyment for enjoyment’s sake through truth-relative talk. “[F]or if 
the nature of anything were simple, the same action would always be most pleasant 
to it. This is why God always enjoys a single and simple pleasure; for there is not only 
an activity of movement but an activity of immobility, and pleasure is found more in 
rest than in movement.”31 The Aristotelian immobile mover embodies a particular 
unity of homeostatic enjoyment, being, and thinking. Aristotle distinguishes this 
pleasure of calmness within the balance of the good life from the understanding of 
the Sophists. Their philosophizing disturbs the homeostatic order of being. It does 
not articulate itself for the sake of truth, but produces the pleasure of speaking in 
favor of a normativity-free enjoyment: enjoyment for enjoyment’s sake. This is one 
reason why, from the 1960s onwards, Lacan compares Aristotle with the Kantian 
moral law, as we mentioned earlier.   
Weiner’s lifeworld may have contracted into an experience of libidinal intensity 
in the moment when the mentioned photo was sent – an intensity that no longer 
knows any pleasure principle in its ordinary form of “right desire.” From this intensity, 
which is experienced with sexual relish, the individual may suspect that he/she can 
no longer catch up with the coming catastrophe, and yet cannot refuse the 
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command – to send the photo. We find here jouissance in its purest form: a minimal 
ontological inconsistency injected into a seemingly homeostatic basic structure of 
being by a “slight deviation” (Lat. “clinamen”; Lucretius and Epicurus) – triggered by 
pushing “send.” 
But why, one might argue as a good Aristotelian and as a proponent of the 
good life is jouissance not simply an affect that is part of our psychic household, 
which, according to a long philosophical tradition from Plato to Kant, is attributed to 
the soul next to reason and emotion? Enjoyment would, in this line of argument, be a 
continuation of the classical triad of “epithymetikon” (appetite), “thymos” (temper), 
and “logos” (reason), which, when triggered, is nothing more than “weakness of the 
will” or a “syllogistic bastard” (Aristotle/Davidson).32 For Lacan, though, this 
subjugation of jouissance into either appetite or temper neglects its reasonable 
employment: to help to settle the account of an individual’s lifeworld as forced choice 
by an individual’s questioning of the symbolic universe all together via a trifling 
deviation.  
 
4. Forced choice 
Central to Lacan’s understanding of the ego’s process of socialization is the 
description of a sacrificial situation. In it, a pre-symbolic life-substance of enjoyment 
has to be given up as it paradoxically emerges with the development of the symbolic 
order as the ego’s other side of self-reflexivity.33 The sacrificial situation is constitutive 
and, in the context of various social contract-theories, concerns the incorporation of 
the subject into the administered form of communal enjoyment and communal 
reasons. Donald Davidson speaks of “triangulation” to describe the change of a 
sentient being into a sapient one. The latter subjugates him- or herself to multiple 
justified true beliefs within chains of signifiers and communitarian rule-patterns.34 
This process of sacrifice is what Lacan calls “forced choice” (also referred to as “your 
money or your life!”). The subject, who is supposed to choose freely her/his 
community (for only a free choice is morally binding) does not exist before this 
choice.35 It is constituted by it. The choice is paradoxical, therefore, in principle. 
Insofar as the single individual keeps the freedom of choice, it does so only if it has 
already made the right decision of subordination to the pre-existing social contract of 
the community. If I choose the “other” of community, I risk the freedom to lose the 
choice myself. “Clinically speaking, I choose psychosis” (Žižek).36  
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One of Lacan’s sources is obviously Hegel since according to the latter, spirit 
incorporates sacrifice as its formal structure. Different sensations that the individual 
receives through sense-perception are not only perceived and experienced directly 
by the individual, but also conveyed as a moment of the ego-function’s self-reflexivity 
in its co-dependence of others (Sittlichkeit). Sacrificed is, according to Lacan’s theory 
of the act of choice, that which he calls with reference both to Kant as well as to 
Heidegger and Freud the “thing”, which we already mentioned. It is the incestuous 
object in which an impossible enjoyment is allegedly embodied as it is fantasized. 
The Thing as the impossible is “that which I call the beyond-of-the signifier.”37 Striving 
for impossible enjoyment becomes our fundamental task. It leads to the fact that we 
all participate in Kulturarbeit (Freud) in its various forms as a form of compensation 
for the unreachable surplus-enjoyment of pleasure that, annoyingly, remains always 
at a radical distance and, apparently, out of reach. And it has of course to be out of 
reach. Only an impossible object can be the source of proof that there is more in the 
subject than the subject itself. 
Lacan expresses this idea among others in his text on the Graph of Desire.38 
The so-called split subject must – in the context of the mentioned forced choice – 
plunge into the symbolic order of the big Other, so that, in the end, a small vegetative 
organism of a toddler emerges actually as, for example, Prince William Duke of 
Cambridge with all his insignia transmitted to him by the House of Windsor. An 
organism sacrifices a pre-symbolic life-substance of enjoyment to not only play a 
prince’s role but to enjoy the symptoms of a prince as one’s own. The American neo-
pragmatist Robert Brandom describes these processes of sacrifice analogously in 
his theory of inferentialism. Sapient beings are trained so long as their sentient 
properties are subordinated to “right moves” in a game of mutual “scorekeeping” of 
giving and asking for reasons.39 This process, though, has antinomic dimensions that 
were acknowledged already by Rousseau and transmitted via Kant onto Hegel as 
the paradox of autonomy – which is the paradox of “forced choice” seen from a 
different angle. They stand out when one tries to pin down the mentioned 
competence with a certain date, a certain age or a final exam. Kant circumvents the 
problem by accentuating, against Brandom, that, for example, morality cannot be 
learned, as it depends on a “revolution of disposition.”40 Morality is presented as an 
excess of life within nature’s causes and effects. In other words: The human being 
always comes too late to his “correct moves” and this unsettles her/him. The 
threshold between the place where we are trained as moral beings and the place 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 







where we are autonomous in our moral behavior (playing properly the game of 
giving and asking for reasons) is surrounded by a principle of uncertainty, which 
again plays into the condition of being forced to choose one’s “character” (Kant), 
one’s life, one’s morality. Lacan: “Desire is a relationship of being to lack. This lack is 
the lack of being [...] This lack is beyond anything which can represent it.”41  
With Lacan, therefore, one could say that the subject will retrospectively open 
up the big Other (the moral Law, in Kantian terms) according to the subjectivation 
thesis of the Graph of Desire, as the individual itself is unconsciously posited by the 
big Other (the Law). After all, this means “forced choice.” In doing so, self-images play 
a crucial role that are co-defined by the big Other and confirmed from the so-called 
Mirror Stage onwards. The self-image puts a primary bifurcation into the totality of 
the organism’s libidinal energies. One result is that the unity of the Imago must, 
according to Lacan, always be inadequate to the abundance of desires that waggle 
on in our pre-symbolized bodies, which, in turn, are the recrements of our symbolic 
bodies. There is always a desire left over, not taken care of within the rise in the 
Imago. It is these desires that pop up in the lives of colonel Tall and Anthony Weiner. 
Lacan: “This image is the ring, the bottleneck through which the confused bundle of 
desire and need must pass through to be it, that is, to reach its imaginary structure.”42 
The Imago / Gestalt stands for a standstill. This structural process of subjectivity is 
always a path of suffering since the psyche is, allegorically speaking, pushed through 
the mentioned ring in order to be recognized and symbolically equipped with a joyful 
investment that binds the individual to phantasies which are at the borderline of 
individuality and sociality. The forced choice cannot be put to rest. It lingers on in 
self-reflexivity causing lustful pain of the ego’s self-relation with that which – coming 
from the unconscious – it is not. Tall and Weiner thus exemplify subjectivity’s 
dependence on jouissance as an ontological factor with regard to “forced choice” in 
a way that transcends Lacan’s more clinical comments on excessive desires 
personified in both Antigone and Teresa of Ávila.  
Now, it is interesting that also Kant grounds his theory of the moral choice with 
the help of a purely a priori theory of a revolutionary choice of character. Before we 
became empirical subjects, we have – so Kant – chosen our “disposition” with regard 
to the moral law.43 Kant speaks of an a priori choice between good and evil since this 
choice is, for him, a necessary condition in grounding the moral subject in a 
noumenal realm outside of space and time. Only this choice can guarantee that we 
as empirical beings within the causal structures of nature can claim responsibility for 
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our evil deeds. In other words, something else in us has chosen our moral 
disposition without an empirical proof of this primordial “forced choice.” But the 
Kantian choice in its noumenal dimension is always in the making.44 The “forced 
choice” of disposition has taken place, yet at the same time it haunts us every time 
the moral law confronts us. As we never know what kind of disposition our noumenal 
self has chosen, we never know how we will choose in the present. Indeed, we are 
apparently predestined, but exactly how this Kantian predestination has turned out, 
for the good or for the bad, can only be realized too late. In the individual’s life this 
choice is, as it were, permanently in the suspension of our choosing, because “I still 
live” and therefore always have to face the moral law again and again. This applies 
not only to the moral law, but to the “forced choice” in the Lacanian sense as well. It 
has always taken place (in the past) and is still in the making (in the present).  
Colonel Tall and Anthony Weiner grab on, speculatively thinking, to this “forced 
choice” in the making. “Untold buckets of shit” are supposed to be transsubstantiated 
into surplus enjoyment whatever the costs of life may be for colonel Tall. The goal is 
a transcendental fantasy: the reestablishment of Tall’s or Weiner’s sufficient reason 
for their surplus-enjoyment-deprived existence. The mind’s higher-order abilities may 
truly have “forgotten” what it had to choose in the process of entering into (and 
establishing) a frame of certainty, but this does not mean that unconscious parts of 
the psyche share the imposed process of forgetting/choosing. An anti-Platonic 
“anamnesis” sets in with consequences that crisscross everything that the Platonic 
understanding of anamnesis stands for. No clearly defined universals are found, 
except for forces of a nether-world within the ego and its communal dis-functioning. 
Those parts of the psyche that resisted forced choices can continue to inexist in the 
mentioned form of a lust-full pain and pleasure disturbance that is both troubling as 
well as electrifying for the mind. For these reasons, we can be terrified and 
bewildered by our dreams, but also by our actions, exemplified above by colonel Tall 
and Anthony Weiner. What do actions like these stand for? They may stand for an 
unconscious objection to the forced choice by an apparently minor deviation.  
 
5. Touching the Thing 
In line with the arguments presented above, I understand jouissance (1) in 
accordance with many scholars in the field of Lacanian philosophy of 
psychoanalysis as a painful-lust in the psyche’s libidinal economy. Especially 
“impossible jouissance” (Miller) captures a paradoxical and ultimately necessary 
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obscene operation of our mind to transgress certain legal and homeostatic forms of 
the internalized symbolic norms to which our psyche, in its self-relation, had to 
submit. Subsequently, however, I understand jouissance (2) as an enigmatic desire 
of vengeance that tries to re-enact the forced choice that the individual experienced 
through “abjection.” The mind feels not only the lustful urge to transgress normative 
limits, to slash out against the investiture of the self, but it wants to repeat the forced 
choice (through abjection), though this time from an allegedly empowered position 
that gives the individual a proper option – whatever it may cost for her or his life, or 
the life of others. Here jouissance can be defined as an urge to suspend the original 
and ultimately unconscious gesture of forced choice – of submission. It aims at 
resetting the individual’s condition of life-submissions by resetting the big Other.  
 This interpretation of jouissance is in part indebted to Slavoj Žižek. He argues 
that the subject’s experience of the political has to be aroused through specific 
relations to jouissance. It is via obscene enjoyment that people will get to know the 
deeper Truth intimated for them by their regime’s master signifiers: “nation,” “God,” or 
“our way of life,” and so forth. Žižek argues that it is such ostensibly nonpolitical and 
culturally specific practices as these that irreplaceably single out any political 
community from its enemies.45 But what Žižek says about jouissance as a political 
factor is even more valid for the subject’s libidinal economy towards him- or herself 
in an ontological sense. Therefore, it is, as already mentioned, indeed too easy to 
reduce irrational patterns of behavior to emotions and affects that conquer reason 
and produce a syllogistic bastard.46 Reason itself conquers affects in the name of the 
deviation for the latter’s sake. If Tall’s or Weiner’s superego could speak in the 
situations mentioned above, it might say: “Disrupt for a fraction of a second 
everyday-life and all its normative burdens that you depend on. Now everything 
depends on you.” Or: “Show, what no one is allowed to see. Expose your desire in its 
purest form to all symbolic claims against you.” “Touch the thing. Touch what you 
had to sacrifice to be in this (miserable or so-called perfect) life, that is yours.” 
As already mentioned, Lacan detects similar kinds of enjoyment beyond 
pleasure next to Teresa of Ávila also in the sublime personality of Antigone. But these 
examples of unrestrained enjoyment, prominently commented on by Lacan in his 
Seminar VII and subsequently by many Lacanian scholars, often compel us to 
overlook too quickly that jouissance does not have to favor sublime ideas, as 
Antigone does, but obscene and even horrific ones as well: the death of others or 
child-pornography.  
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Having said this, it must be emphasized here too that even if, in my line of 
argument, the “good life” serves as a contrast-foil to the work of jouissance in its all-
or-nothing form, we encounter of course certain aspects of joyful rebellion against 
parts of the established good life all the time.47 Miller’s fourth and fifth paradigms, 
called “Normal Jouissance” and “Discursive Jouissance,” can be mentioned here 
together with Slavoj Žižek’s, Mari Ruti’s, Jodi Dean’s, and my own references to 
enjoyment as a political factor.48 “Normal Jouissance” is explained by Miller with 
regard to Seminar XI in which Lacan breaks jouissance up into various object a(s). 
This kind of “jouissance is not reached by heroic transgression, but by the coming to 
mind of the drive, by the drive which makes a return trip.”49 Here, Jouissance plays 
obviously a less destructive role. People have accepted the ready-made symbolic 
order received from birth and cope now, in the pursuit of touching the Thing, with 
jouissance, without risking all for nothing. This paper’s focus on jouissance as 
enigmatic vengeance (against “forced choice”) does not want to diminish these 
lesser forms. Its focus on jouissance of enigmatic vengeance is grounded exclusively 
in the aspiration to outline the concept’s hidden ontological implications in the 
subject-world relation as much as possible through acts of abjection. 
 Weiner followed, speculatively thinking, an unconscious command to be a-
rational (not irrational): to risk everything for nothing. Because, as I said, he did it 
again (“encore”). Jouissance is included in the pleasure principle, but does not 
belong to this principle. It is an excess that cannot be seen as excess because its 
scale falls into its own form detached from the norm. And this form out of form is 
reflected upon by Kant in his moral law, since it is especially in its “holyness” (Hegel) 
when it is most akin to Kant’s concept of the “devilishly evil” (das teuflisch Böse).  
Colonel Tall’s destiny, which bares resemblance to Ernst Jünger’s fate as 
described in a famous text from 1925 with the title Copse 125. A Chronical from the 
Trench Warfare of 191850, illuminates this. For Tall, everything depends on getting his 
share out of untamed logics of worlds that, until now, could not guarantee him an 
unbiased distribution of wellbeing or a place to enjoy himself being himself. The 
same may be true for the fate of Anthony Weiner within the perspective presented in 
the paragraphs above. In sending the mentioned erotic photos, he can proof his 
ability to accept the full ontological weight of his symbolic world by risking his 
reputation, the reputation of his wife, and the reputation of a potential president of 
the United States by touching the “send” button. Not only for Lacan but also for Kant 
are humans haunted by what they are not responsible for and yet have to take 
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responsibility for. Lacan invokes the symbolic order to underline how the “forced 
choice” has turned out yesterday or will turn out tomorrow – allegedly. Jouissance is 
ever present here in the human libidinal economy since subjects strive for the truth of 
their being and seek to liberate themselves from the mentioned choice that never 
was a fair or truthful one, a choice that granted subjectivity its “suum cuique”. One 
could also say with another concept of Lacan that we as human beings strive for the 
“thing,” i.e., the entity from which we as subjects were deprived within the mentioned 
sacrificial structure that brings subjectivity to the fore. Jouissance strives to get a grip 
on the noumenal realm of this thing as that (noumenal entity), which had to be 
rejected for subjectivity so that objectivity could emerge. The “thing” is the 
phantasmagoric archetype of a lost object through which absolute enjoyment would 
be possible. And this is what “small deviations” (Lat. “clinamen”) or “trifling irritations” 
of the symbolic universe, mentioned above, strive for: to touch upon a spectral entity 




Figure 2: Split subject and the thing, by F. Depoortere. 
 
As such, jouissance can urge someone who leads a happy family life, who has 
a fulfilling job, or who is on all levels of his fate apparently a happy person – to risk 
everything for nothing, a nothing that incorporates a particular nugget of enjoyment. 
In situations like these, the “clinamen,” i.e., the “deviation / excess,” attempts to touch 
upon the lost and forbidden thing from which one was separated. The goal is to give 
consistency to the contingent reality from a place out of place, without which even 
the most beautiful family-idyll can be felt as an unsupportable hell. But this 
subjectivity must be willing to enjoy risking everything for nothing. Jouissance, here, 
enjoys its own form of re-installing the symbolic. This, though, works only when the 
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forbidden thing is felt coming closer into the subject’s range. The picture-message is 
sent, the command to conquer “Copse 125” is given. Abjection accomplished. The 
psyche may be flooded by an autonomizing elixir of life in sending the image, since 
now it is the individual who can subjectivize everything for nothing. Then, the 
outcome could still be horrible, but at least it was the result of a choice, not the 
collateral damage of a forced choice. In jouissance-charged actions, the psyche 
recovers part of the disciplinary costs passed on to him/her by the big Other. The 
psyche seeks to retrieve the credit imposed on itself, which is only possible if a cost-
and-benefit calculation in the symbolic-libidinal household of the individual is 
rejected completely. In this way jouissance tries to find a space of an existential auto-
creation in which everything in relation to pure nothing has to be at stake. Think 
again of Weiner’s fate. I do not want to deny that a pathological addiction to sexual 
arousal may have driven the man. But I think sexuality as an affect can just be one of 
many variables in a complex equation that can have strong ontological components 
with unacknowledged desires beneath the ego’s reasons. In jouissance and in the 
rejection of the symbolic order by an obscene and liberating gesture of excess, an 
unconscious act of freedom may be hidden. Incidentally, Lacan sees such an act of 
freedom in the work of Marquis de Sade. The latter does not want to create lust or 
eroticism, but, as Lacan says, “approach [the reader] to a burning center or an 
absolute zero. [...] Sade’s work belongs to the order of what I shall call experimental 
literature. The work of art in this case is an experiment that through its action cuts the 
subject loose from his psychosocial moorings – or to be more precise, from all 
psychosocial appreciation of the sublimation involved.”52 
It does not matter if we approve of this or not. For Lacan, the ethics of 
psychoanalysis is not linked to “right desire” within a plurality of forms of the “good 
life.” In jouissance we are essentially dealing with the subject as a limit to the world. 
The desire of jouissance is an uprising of the unconscious against the costs of 
submission into chains of signifiers. 
 
6. Non-actuality 
Terrence Malick’s movie-title evokes the ambivalence of a Thin Red Line. The latter 
has an outstanding property since it can be seen only when it has been violated or 
crossed. The line literally separates human reason from jouissance. Its relation to the 
Lacanian “thing” does not exist as a boundary between rationality, on the one hand, 
and jouissance and temper, on the other. Rather, the reference to the line’s thinness 
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means more: namely, that we cannot make it out. It becomes visible only in looking 
back. Malick underlines this insight in an important scene in the last part of the movie 
(figure 3). We see Colonel Tall in a sitting posture of exhausted contemplation almost 















The battle has been fought successfully, although with high losses of 
American lives. Corpses and battle debris lie around like senseless props with an 
expired meaning. Did Colonel Tall really have to go that far? Of course, since the red 
line can, as I said, be measured only through looking back. Tall had to equip an 
inconsistent outside world with consistency. He had to save his life by risking (at 
least from his perspective) everything for nothing. A seemingly small deviation of a 
soldier’s career became the sufficient reason to tie together subjectivity and 
objectivity, for a decisive moment. No one thinks after these kinds of battles of words 
such as “Since 5h45 a.m. we have been returning the fire” or asks who is actually 
responsible for the Syrian War. All the circumstances are somehow clear, now that 
jouissance has come to an end. Tell is sad but satisfied mentally and bodily. The 
battle gave his miserable life an ontological contact with reality. This may underline 
Lacan’s insight that subjectivity must time and again make the experience of 
madness in order to step out of itself and into the corset of the symbolic order anew. 
Indeed, jouissance is the painful libidinal fuel that is requisite within the mind in order 
to go so far. It is the only substance that psychoanalysis claims to exist. Substances 
are immutable bearers of change according to the classical definition, as I 
Figure 3: Film scene from The Thin Red Line. 
Figure 4: Dürer; Melencolia I, Detail. 
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understand Lacan here. Jouissance belongs to the basic structure of reality since it 
remains the same basic feature in the subject-object dichotomy in all possible 
worlds. Hegel has given us an ingenious formulation of this power of jouissance as 
negativity’s driving force for spirit that knows no dependency on the pleasure 
principle as well. In the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, he famously writes 
sentences that could have well been cited as a voice-over to Colonel Tall’s 
contemplative silence. "Death, if that is what we want to call this non-actuality, is of 
all things the most dreadful, and to hold fast what is dead requires the greatest 
strength. [...] But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself 
untouched by devastation, but rather is the life that endures it and maintains itself in 
it. Spirit only wins its truth by finding its feet within its absolute disruption. [...] This 
tarrying with the negative is the magical power that converts it into being.”53  
We should not take Hegel’s understanding of spirit as an instance of divine 
sublimity, but rather in the sense of Lacan, as a power source of raging jouissance, 
which blurs the line between rationality, affect and irrationality, thus destabilizing the 
subject-object dichotomy ad infinitum. The colonel did not know where the red line 
between jouissance and reason was hiding. He discovered it as an unconscious 
desire looking back after trying to touch upon the Thing as the sufficient cause of 
reality. The colonel had to carry out his act because the symbolic order at its core 
carries even these insane formations at its origin. And jouissance repeatedly draws 
us back to this source of a forced choice, which we are called upon to re-set. The 
battle is an encounter with the real without the need for the colonel to know what the 
real is. Similarly, for a politician, a priest, or an actor, a nude photo of a minor girl or 
boy may be such an encounter with the real. The lustful real presence can extinguish 
the symbolic order with force because it is able to make the world coherent. In other 
words, when I am confronted with this lustful presence of utmost danger for my own 
symbolic role, I experience pleasure, because I can (allegedly) re-negotiate the social 
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